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Abstract The economic rationale for austerity policies harks back to a highly controversial
proposals that originated in the 1990s known as ‘expansionary iscal contraction.’ This paper
explores these ideas relating to austerity and suggests that matters have not worked out as George
Osborne expected. Furthermore, since the broad assumptions made by HM Treasury and the OBR
remain the same in 2015 as they were in 2010, the paper presents an argument why austerity plans
for the period 2016–2020 are also unlikely to succeed.
The core arguments in the paper can be summarised by the following bullet points:
• Politically motivated suggestions that the economy crashed in 2007–08 because of Labour’s
overspending are not supported by the data. Indeed, by the time it left oice the Labour
government had adopted a more realistic basis for economic forecasting than the following
government.
• In contrast to the generally perceived view, austerity only hit current spending per head from
2013 onwards, from which time on a signiicant downward trend in current spending per head
of population is noticeable in the available data and forecasts.
• Despite the rhetoric of increasing and intolerable debt interest burden, the actual cost per
head in 2015–16 is unlikely to be greater than pre-crisis levels on a per capita basis.
• The second Cameron government is planning to increase government spending, particularly
in discretionary areas at around the time of the next general election in 2020.
• There has been a fundamental shift in the way that government spending beneits people in
the UK. ‘Feel good items’ spending (health, education, infrastructure) per capita has declined
sharply since 2008, while annually managed spending (mainly welfare and debt interest) has
increased. These diverging trends clearly have diferential efects on groups in society.
• Government policy aims to increase income tax and national insurance as a proportion of
overall revenue, and at rates in excess of GDP growth, in the next ive years, whilst reducing
corporation taxes signiicantly.
• The government forecaster – the Oice for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – is adopting a low,
and in our view, unrealistic multiplier for government spending (range of 0.6 to 1.0). This is
much lower than the one adopted by the IMF (0.9 to 1.7) or Standard & Poor (up to 2.5).
The low multiplier adopted by the OBR has led to persistent overestimation of the beneit
of austerity and constant upwards revision of public borrowing needs.
• The Oice for Budget Responsibility forecasts for balancing the books by 2020 is premised
on very signiicant, and in our view unrealistic, changes in the pattern of behaviour of the
private sector within the UK economy and the external sectors over the next few years.
• The Fiscal Charter is neither feasible, nor desirable, for the UK economy.
• It is not desirable because it is premised on considerable growing debt burdens shouldered
by the private sectors (households and business community) and overseas trade sector.
• It is not feasible because it assumes a linear and highly magniied projections of growth trends
in the private and external sectors that began an either in the middle or 2014 or the early
2015 into the future but are very unlikely to continue unabated.
• If the rate of inaccuracy of OBR forecasts from 2011–12 to 2015–16 was replicated in the
years 2015–16 to 2019–20 then, based on the July 2015 OBR forecast, an additional £162
billion would be borrowed over this period, and at the end of the 2015-2020 parliament the
budget would not be running a surplus of £10.2 billion but would instead be showing a deicit
of £39.3 billion.
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Part 1: Introduction
The term austerity entered the political narrative in the UK with the ascent to oice of George
Osborne in 2010.1 The economic rationale for austerity policies was based on three premises.
First was the premise that the UK economy was ‘broken’ and needed radical structural change.
Second was the premise that governments must ‘balance the books’, and hence cannot borrow
to invest, and third, that balancing the books is the appropriate policy in any event to stimulate
growth. It is not our intention in this paper to recall the historical evolution of these ideas. We
note, however, that at early stages the three premises were not necessarily linked to one another
and were not considered part of a comprehensive philosophy. At the initial stage, the Cameron
government simply found itself in a position that it described as ‘running out of money’ meaning
that it resisted calls for ‘debt-fuelled tax cuts and extra spending’.2 It was only towards the end
of its irst year in oice that the theme of ‘running out of money’ was replaced by the theme
of the ‘broken economy,’ and the causes of the ‘broken economy’, in turn, were linked irmly to
Labour’s stewardship of the economy prior to the crisis.3
The core argument for austerity economics as the harbinger of economic growth harks back
to highly controversial proposals that originated in the 1990s known as ‘expansionary iscal
contraction.’4 The idea behind these proposals is that the public and private sectors compete
over the same pool of capital. It follows that if a policy of deliberate delation in wages, prices and
public spending through reduction in the state’s budgets, deicits and debts was pursued, then
business conidence would be created as the foundation for growth. The state would no longer
be ‘crowding out’ the private sector in a race to command scarce capital, resources or labour.
The assumption is that private sector’s use of these resources (lower cost of capital, resources
or labour) would result in higher growth than if they were used by the state (for discussion see:
Barry & Devereux, 1995; Blyth, 2013).
Expansionary iscal contraction theory is predicated, in other words, on three linked, but
highly controversial assumptions: irst, that there is a inite pool of available capital at a national
level; second, that interest rates at national level are determined by a simple demand and supply
curve; and third, that private sector investment (and correspondingly, debt) is always preferable
to the public sector investment (and hence also debt).5
1The political economy of the UK was almost wholly unfamiliar with the concept of austerity before 2010. It
is true that Gordon Brown had spent much of the previous thirteen years discussing what he called prudence,
and in the process persuaded his main political opponents that this was a policy that they too must pursue, but
his meaning was very diferent from the austerity that was to follow his period of oice. Gordon Brown deined
prudence in two ways in 1998: there was the golden rule that said that over the economic cycle the Government
would borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending; and then there was the sustainable investment rule
that required that net public debt as a proportion of GDP would be held over the economic cycle at a stable and
prudent level (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1998). In practice this was interpreted as balancing the government’s
books over an economic cycle. It was unfortunate for Brown’s legacy that he declared an intention to end the end
of boom and bust cycles in the UK economy when that did not happen. See Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1999,
para 1.6 (Kirkup, 2008).
2See for instance: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9107485/George-Osborne-UK-has-run-out-of-
money.html
3The argument was that by running a controlled borrowing program prior to the crisis at an acceptable level,
the British government found itself unprepared to deal with a major exogenous shock of the magnitude of the
crisis of 2007–8 and ‘ran out of money’ at a crucial point. Hence, Gordon Brown’s ‘prudence’ was no longer the
appropriate policy.
4There is an ongoing debate with regards to adopting policies of balanced budget rule (BBR). The European
Union is introducing the so-called iscal compact that would require government budgets to be balance in surplus
with a maximum level of annual structural deicit of 0.5% of GDP (Ghilardi & Rossi, 2014). This paper is not
intended as a contribution to the considerable theoretical work on BBR. Rather we analyse current and planned
policies of the UK government in order to gauge their feasibility or indeed, desirability.
5It is not our intention to discuss in depth the arguments that drive such theories. Suice to say that in our
view, none of these assumptions corresponds to the reality of modern, globalized inancial markets.
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This belief in the superior performance of the private sector has been implicit in the forecasting
methodology adopted by the UK Oice for Budget Responsibility (OBR), which George Osborne
established in 2010 to audit the Treasury’s economic forecasts (a task previously undertaken for
Labour by the National Audit Oice). The OBR has worked on the assumption since 2010 that
the multiplier6 to be applied to government revenue spending has been around 0.6 on average.
The OBR has been a little more generous with the multiplier impact of government investment
spending, where it has assumed the multiplier to be 1 (Oice for Budget Responsibility, 2015,
39). The implications of the OBR’s methodology are far reaching: Controversially, as we will
discuss below, the OBR’s forecasting methodology assumes that government revenue spending
actually reduces GDP, whilst government investment could at best just recover cost. It follows
from this methodology that any transfer of resources to the private sector – whether by tax cuts
or reduction in spending – is bound to increase the growth rate in the economy.
In addition to these assumptions, ‘expansionary iscal contraction’ is accompanied by another
implicit but equally debateable assumption that can be described as front-loading transmission
mechanism. This is that once the state has announced its intention to reduce demand for
resources and tax revenues, the private sector responds by borrowing more in anticipation of that
combination of growing income and reduced taxation since these would, in an ideal world, provide
the means for repayment of that borrowing. This point is crucial. It meant that government
could be indiferent to rising private sector debt because they argued that reduced government
activity would make that private sector debt afordable.
The assumption of a front-loading transmission mechanism can be further dis-aggregated
into two related theories. The irst is that the private sector reacts in anticipation to future
impact of declared policy which is matched by the commensurate belief that government must
develop and nurture the credibility of its own policy announcements in order to ensure that these
announcements have their intended efects.
Second, but not necessarily related, is the belief that private sector borrowing would increase
once a policy of austerity is announced because the private sector believes in the notion of
expansionary iscal contraction theory. Although rarely presented in these terms, in efect, a
policy of expansionary iscal contraction would shift, then, the debt burdens in the economy from
the public to private sectors. An argument for increasing private sectors debt, however, does
not sound like a winnable political formula. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this side of the equation
is rarely advertised in the political debates in the UK. One of the arguments presented in this
paper is that it should be discussed.
This paper explores these ideas relating to austerity and suggests that matters have not
worked out as George Osborne expected. Furthermore, since the broad assumptions made by
HM Treasury and the OBR remain the same in 2015 as they were in 2010, the paper analyses
the reasons why the austerity plans for the period 2016 to 2020 is unlikely to succeed. To reach
these conclusions the paper is split into a number of parts.
Part 2 of the paper examines whether or not the irst Cameron government adopted austerity
policy. The question is relevant since some economists, including Paul Krugman (Krugman,
2015), have suggested that after 2012 this policy was largely abandoned, even if the rhetoric was
not.
6In economics, the iscal multiplier is the ratio of a change in national income to the change in government
spending that causes it. When this multiplier exceeds one the enhanced efect on national income is called
the multiplier efect. The mechanism that can give rise to a multiplier efect is that an initial incremental
amount of spending can lead to increased consumption spending, increasing income further and hence further
increasing consumption, etc., resulting in an overall increase in national income greater than the initial incremental
amount of spending. In other words, an initial change in aggregate demand may cause a change in aggregate
output (and hence the aggregate income that it generates) that is a multiple of the initial change. Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_multiplier
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Part 3 explores what the implications of the policy of austerity have been on tax revenues
and various types of spending and explains as a consequence why the focus of austerity policy
has now come to rest on social security beneits.
Part 4 looks at what the outcome of austerity programmes has to suggest about the quality
of economic forecasting since 2010, in particular, and considers in that context whether the
multipliers for government spending were ever close to those assumed by the Oice for Budget
Responsibility.
Part 5 looks at whether austerity can succeed in balancing the UK government’s books on
the basis of the July 2015 projections, with a focus on sector balances.
Part 6 concludes with the suggestion that considerable political stress may arise before 2020
if the austerity programme fails, as this paper suggests, to deliver economic outcomes that match
the current government political rhetoric.
Part 2: Has there been austerity?
The practical interpretation of the policy of austerity, whatever its already noted theoretical
justiications might be, is that government spending should be reduced in order to reduce deicits
and government debt. The theory is that delation in prices, wages and government spending
will provide the foundations for expansion in private sector market activity. Considering the
degree of ‘spin’ associated with the political narratives of the ‘broken’ British economy, or the
often-mentioned reduction in borrowing (calculated from its absolute peak),7 it is worth asking
whether an austerity policy was pursued with any rigour during the irst Cameron government
– or whether or not it was pursued at all (Krugman, 2015).
To test whether the government in oice from 2010–2015 has indeed pursued a policy of
austerity, a number of economic indicators have been assessed. First, data on actual government
income and expenditure over the period from 2000 has been collected. This proved not to be
as straightforward an exercise as might be presumed: the Treasury did not publish whole of
Government Accounts throughout much of this period and those that are now produced are not
consistent in format with HM Treasury of Oice or Budget Responsibility forecasting formats.
As a result, data on actual annual out-turns have been collected from successive HM Treasury
budget reports published throughout this period. It is important to note that these appear
subject to subsequent, usually poorly explained, revisions, but these appear immaterial to this
exercise.
Where problems are more signiicant is in the reporting of planned government departmental
spending. The OBR has admitted in correspondence with the authors of this paper to having
diiculty in tracking HM Treasury reporting on this issue. Budget reports for total planned de-
partmental and annually managed spending are used in this report in the main when considering
spending. When departmental analysis is presented the data used comes from annual forecasts
from HM Treasury budget reports against which it appears outcomes are rarely reported. These
forecasts may in some periods (e.g. 2009) be unreliable as a result, but we consider them useful
nonetheless in indicating the expectations of the Treasury, which is of signiicance to the current
discussion.
Figure 1 shows raw data on the noted variables for the periods 2000–01 to 2014–15 (outcomes)
and 2015–16 to 2020–21 (forecasts from the OBR report supporting the July 2015 ‘emergency’
budget). The only adjustment has been to restate the data in constant 2014–15 prices using the
GDP delator for this purpose since this is macroeconomic data:
7David Cameron: “It is this Government who have cut the deicit we inherited by a quarter’; ’Claire Perry
MP: “The deicit down by 25% since the election” (BBC Question Time, 25 October 2012). For discussion see:
https://fullfact.org/factchecks/budget_deicit_public_sector_net_borrowing_current_quarter-28563
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Figure 1. Source: HM Treasury budget reports 2000–2015 and OBR forecasts, July 2015
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A number of points should be noted. First, this data clearly shows that there was a signiicant
increase in government spending between 2000 and 2009. Such increases were matched by a
similarly signiicant increase in government revenues. In fact, during this period revenues are
closely correlated with the spending of the previous year. It appears therefore that increase in
debt over this period was due to a time-lag efect. Deicit spending arose dramatically only from
2007–08 onwards (Figure 2). Hence, our irst conclusion: the politically motivated suggestion
that the economy crashed in 2007–08 because of Labour’s overspending is not supported by the
data. On the contrary, Figure 2 supports the impression of an economy managed in a fashion
consistent with Gordon Brown’s stated economic objectives before that date.8
This view is supported by a recently published IMF review of the British Economy. It is worth
quoting the report at length not because we necessarily agree with the IMF’s report or conclusions
but, crucially, because the current government claims to adopt the IMF’s methodology in its
policy and forecasting. The IMF, it appears, does not seem to share the theory of the ‘broken’
British economy prior to the crisis:
Business investment played an important role in boosting the UK’s pre-crisis growth.
In the decade leading to the global inancial crisis, business investment grew 4 percent
a year on average, with the capital-to-labor ratio rising faster than in many other
economies. Alongside, capital productivity (measured as output divided by net cap-
ital stock) grew faster than in many other advanced economies, reaching the highest
level just before the global inancial crisis erupted.
Supply-side growth accounting conirms that growth in the UK was broad-based in
the pre-crisis years (1997–2007).
Capital was the most important driver of overall growth. Moreover the large accumu-
lation of capital in information and communication technology (ICT) boosted growth
directly and indirectly (through its contribution to higher productivity growth).
The UK’s strong growth performance was also supported by an eicient allocation of
resources
But the crisis appears to have broken the UK’s positive growth pattern.
(IMF, 2015, pp. 20–21)
This last point is important: the IMF is of the view that Labour’s government stewardship
of the economy prior to the crisis was good, but that the policy was broken by an exogenous
shock: the inancial crisis. The terminology used by the IMF about a broken economy due to an
exogenous shock was then mangled for political expediency to present an argument that ‘Labour
left behind a broken economy’.
To return to the data. As Figure 1 illustrates, once the drastic decline in income in 2008–09
and 2009–10 was over, the rate of growth in government income broadly matches pre-crisis trend
in the UK economy. Austerity economics did not much touch revenue trends after the initial
period of inancial shock, but only spending. Here austerity appears to result in the forecasted
lat line for total spending in current prices for a period of almost a decade, as shown by Figure
1.
This is not the only possible way, however, to interpret this data. If data is restated as a
proportion of GDP (Figure 3), it is clear that spending did in fact peak in 2008-09 and has
8The diagnosis is shared by the IMF: ‘Business investment played an important role in boosting the UK’s
pre-crisis growth. In the decade leading to the global inancial crisis, business investment grew 4 percent a year on
average, with the capital-to-labor ratio rising faster than in many other economies. Alongside, capital productivity
(measured as output divided by net capital stock) grew faster than in many other advanced economies, reaching
the highest level just before the global inancial crisis erupted’ (IMF, 2015, 21).
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Figure 2. Source: HM Treasury budget reports 2000–2015
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declined at a remarkably steady rate since then whereas income, stated on this basis, has been
the factor to have lat-lined: the narrative inverts when viewed in this way. Figure 3 does conirm,
therefore, that there is an argument that a steady austerity was in place from 2008–09.
This austerity was initially achieved by steadily reducing investment spending in the period
from 2010 to 2013. Changes to spending patterns thereafter are complex. In particular, the
decline in investment spending ended in 2013. This may have led some to conclude that austerity
was relaxed in 2013 but this is not consistent with data on planned departmental and annually
managed government spending, both of which continued to decline, steadily, as a proportion of
GDP after 2013.
Figure 3. Source: HM Treasury budget data 2000–2015 and HM Treasury Pocket Book data
September 2015
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In fact this data does not support the view that austerity was relaxed: the ratio of spend to
GDP did, of course, peak in 2008 because of the relative collapse in GDP growth in that year
(in constant 2014–15 prices GDP fell in 2008-09 and 2009–10 by about £40 billion in each year).
In that case the inancial crisis of 2008-9 obviously distorts the impression given of additional
spending in those years, but even with that being noted the rate of decline in total spend as
a proportion of GDP has averaged 0.83 per cent per annum since 2010 and is broadly forecast
to continue to do so. Figure 3 shows consistent decline in government spending since 2009
suggesting that the policy of austerity did not change in 2012, although its composition did.
Just as investment spending recovered from the decline it sufered from 2010 to 2013 by entering
into a period of relatively stable spending in constant prices current spending went into decline.
The same data is better understood if restated on the basis of spending per head in constant
prices (Figure 4). When this is done further signiicant trends emerge, largely because population
increased from 58.89 million in 2000 to 64.1 million in 2013–14 (after which date an increase at
an equivalent annual rate is assumed) (See: www.ons.gov.uk/ons/.../uk-population-estimates-
1851-2013.xls).
This data shows that current spending per head was largely maintained until 2012–13 despite
the impression subsequently created that this was a period of more intense austerity: this im-
pression of austerity was in fact only due to the signiicant decline in investment spending over
the period from 2010–2013. Decline in current spending per head only really started in fact in
2013 on a per capita basis, a fact that informs our second conclusion: in contrast to the generally
perceived view, austerity only hit current spending per head from 2013 onwards.
From that time a signiicant downward trend in current spending per head of population is
noticeable although because of the increase in investment spending in 2013 it is clear there is
an inlexion in the overall downward trend in total government spending per capita in that year
that may have helped create the impression that austerity was, overall, relaxed. We, however,
take the view that the change in composition in the overall spend in that year is critical from
an analytical perspective because in our opinion the most critical variables in determining the
perception most people will have of austerity are current overall, and (most especially) current
planned government spending. This is particularly true because current planned spending, which
has been and is planned to be in steady marked decline is on matters such as health, education,
transport, the police and so on, which have high political signiicance attached to them and where
perceptions of loss are signiicant, most especially amongst those with the greatest capacity to
complain. Because the impact of overall current (as opposed to total) spending cuts per capita
only really started in 2013 it is possible that during 2015 austerity might still have appeared to
have had little impact on many people. The political understanding of this may suggest why a
deliberate upturn in spend appears to be planned late in the current decade, possibly to coincide
with the next general election. This conirms our third conclusion that a political cycle appears
to exist in this trend in current planned spending.
The contrast in these two trends, where overall total and current period spending trends
ofer diferent perspectives on patterns of austerity is important in our opinion: as the public
is likely to notice the impact of investment spending less than reduction in current spending,
the austerity narrative has been sustainable in political rhetoric even though there was, at least
on a per capita measure, a relaxation in austerity in total spending. To put it another way,
the austerity narrative may have survived in popular perception despite the fact that the policy
was temporarily relaxed from 2013 to 2015 on one item: spending on a per capita basis. This
was politically acceptable to many people because current spending cuts only really began to be
signiicant on the same per capita spending basis from 2013 onwards, which was too soon for the
impact to have really been felt by the time of the 2015 general election.
10
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Figure 4. Source: HM Treasury budget data 2000–2015 and ONS population data
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It is important to note at this point that all the suggestions made so far assume that the
collapse in GDP after the 2007–08 inancial crisis is an exogenous variable in this analysis. If,
however, it is instead assumed that one of the goals of any government after the crisis should
have been the restoration of the growth pattern seen prior to its onset then the scale of the
challenge facing them is apparent from Figure 5. GDP is stated here in 2014–15 prices and has
been projected from 2007-08 onwards at the average rate of growth prevailing from 2000-01 until
2007–08, i.e. 2.69% per annum. It is then apparent that there is a substantial element of missing
GDP in the UK economy thereafter, worth £370 billion a year by 2020–21.
Figure 5. Sources: As noted in text
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This has an impact on the perception of austerity, as igure 6 shows.
Figure 6. Sources: As previously noted and authors’ calculations as noted in text
The collapse in GDP growth in 2007–08 and in the following years shown in Figure 5 results
in the appearance shown in Figure 6 that actual spending as a proportion of GDP is generously
high until 2015–16, only after which date it falls below the levels it might have reached in 2009–10
if GDP had not collapsed. That is because only in 2015–16 does the reported rate of government
spending as a proportion of GDP begin to fall below levels planned by the Labour administration
in oice before 2007–08. However, that same austerity when compared to the rate of GDP that
would have been enjoyed if GDP had continued to grow at pre-2008 levels is very marked indeed,
13
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the proportion of government spending planned for 2020-21 being less than 31% of GDP on this
basis.
This is signiicant: government spending as a part of GDP grew from 2000 onwards as part of
a deliberate plan. Government spending rose in order to meet perceived needs, and this spending
does not appear to have hindered growth during that period, not least because tax revenues were
growing as well. What that growth did then indicate was the ability of the UK economy to create
increased economic capacity over this period, which we suggest is now signiicantly underutilized
– possibly explaining the rise in employment without a corresponding rising in investment (IMF,
2015).
These facts may also exacerbate the perception of austerity. The demand for cuts to support
the policy of austerity is taking place during a period when many are experiencing some or all of
unemployment, under-employment, enforced self-employment in marginally proitable activities,
insecure employment or low wages growth. Those in any of these situations are perfectly aware
that their capacity is underutilized and for them austerity is likely to be hard to comprehend.
Part 3: Revenues, 2010–2015
Part 2 focused on government spending during the irst Cameron government, in part 3 we shift
our attention to the revenue side. There are two data sources on spending for the purposes of
this review. One is budget data on actual performance, already used in Part 2 of this paper.
The second is the annual forecast of departmental spending published in each budget since 2000.
Some of these departmental spends are easily identiiable: health, education and defence spending
categories obviously relate to departments of broadly similar name. Some of the available data
is consolidated in government publications. For example, housing, agriculture and employment
spending are combined although they spread across a number of departments. As a result, it
is only possible to approximate from these forecast departmental spending the split between
annually managed spending (welfare, interest, and some aspects of investment, for example) and
departmental planned spending, which is the split used in Figures 1, 3 and 4. The Oice for
Budget Responsibility has advised the authors that time series data on department spending
is diicult to obtain not least because of signiicant shifts in categorisation over time. It is
important to note this when considering the data that follows. These issues being noted, the
annual forecasts of spending when split to approximate between major items (with health and
debt, because of their signiicance, being shown separately), when restated in constant 2014–15
prices and stated as spending per head are as shown in Figure 7.
The reduction in ‘other spending’ from 2012–13 onwards is notable. We suspect that the
decline in this category at the very end of the period is due in part to reclassiication of some
items to speciic departments. We note a marked rise in those department’s spending as if
to compensate. It is otherwise hard to explain the apparent signiicant increases in defence,
transport, industry, housing and public order spending forecasts in 2015–16 as these do not
appear to match any obvious policy announcements.
In contrast, debt spending forecasts fell in 2015–16 because almost £12 billion of proit on
the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility (its quantitative easing programme) was being
recognised for these purposes for the irst time. The result supports our fourth conclusion,
namely, despite the rhetoric of increasing and intolerable debt interest burden,9 the actual cost per
head in 2015–16 is unlikely to be greater than pre-crisis levels on a per capita basis. Substantially
lower interest rates do, of course, help explain this as well.
9See, for example, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/george-osborne-sets-out-his-priorities-for-the-
spending-review
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Figure 7. Sources: As noted in text
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Three issues stand out for consideration: First, there has been a fundamental shift in the
way that government spending beneits people in the UK. From 2000 until about 2007–08 there
was a steady planned increase in ‘feel-good factor’ items represented by planned departmental
spending. These include, for example, health, education and transport, all of which have a
tangible impact on the quality of people’s lives. After 2008, there was marked decline in these
type of spending. From a peak of spend per head (expressed in constant 2014–15 prices) of
5,860 in 2007–08 to £4,430 in 2019–2020, a reduction in real term exceeding 24%. This data is
relected in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Sources: Budget data 2000 to 2015 and OBR forecasts July 2015 and as noted in text
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As indication of the items covered by this decline these are the categories of spending covered
by planned spending in 2015–16:
Table 1. Source: HM Treasury Budget July 2015 page 77
Second, in contrast to those ‘feel good items’, annually managed spending (mainly welfare
and debt interest) increased from £4,270 per head to £5,640 per head in constant prices from
2007–08 to 2019–20. Or an increase of 32.2%. These diverging trends clearly have diferential
efects on groups in society. Some very vocal groups in society may well perceive (correctly, as
the igures show) that they have lost out as a result of a shift in spending patterns. That might
in itself be of little consequence but for changes that have taken place, or are planned to take
place, in taxation. Figure 9 (with this data in aggregate representing total taxation in all years
covered) shows the overall change in payments of taxes by type in constant 2014–15 prices per
head of population.
Income tax receipts fell most heavily after 2008, followed by national insurance contributions,
whereas the changes in VAT (especially the sharp decline in 2009–10) relect the deliberate
rate cuts introduced at that time to counter the immediate impact of recessionary tendencies
within the economy. VAT receipts, however, are not forecast to increase as rapidly as income
tax, national insurance and other taxes, including council taxes. This is in stark contrast with
corporation tax, which has become the most public indicator of the tax contribution made by
business. The contribution from this tax is steadily declining as tax rates have been cut from
28% at the start of the period under review to 18% at the end with the tax base also being
reduced in the meantime, most especially after 2010.
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Figure 9. Sources: UK HM Treasury Budgets 2000–2015 and July 2015 OBR projections and
as noted in text
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Table 2. Source: Oice for Budget Responsibility forecasts July 2015 table 4.5 and author
calculations as noted
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The table above has been extracted from the OBR forecasts for tax revenue published in July
2015. Tax revenues for 2014–15 onwards shown in the irst part of the table have been restated
in the second part on the assumption that they will grow in line with GDP projections. The
resulting expected revenues have then been compared with OBR forecasts for taxes to be collected
and the diferences are then identiied in the second and third parts of the table respectively.
Those diferences show that government policy aims to increase the income tax and national
insurance as proportion of overall revenue in the next ive years whilst reducing corporation taxes
signiicantly. VAT is broadly neutral. Property taxes, such as council taxes, appear to make an
unexpectedly high contribution to make. The implications of these forecasts are that increase
in income and national insurance tax between 2015 until 2020 will be matched by decrease in
beneits from the discretionary spending of government, or those activities from which they are
most likely to perceive an increase in well-being. In other words, austerity during the second
Cameron government will be experienced as higher taxes and lower net beneits from the state,
and all as a consequence of the policy of seeking a balanced budget.
Whether or not such policy is politically sustainable over time is to be seen. The desire to
balance the budget against this background of likely perceived personal cost as a consequence
of what the government is seeking to do is, however, providing explanation for the risk the
government is taking on welfare spending. Because pressure on planned spending has already
reached a point where resistance to further cuts is likely, not least from those working in the
public services as has been seen with strike action by lawyers working in the court system10,
these cuts are going to be hard to deliver. As shown in Figure 8, there is then no option left to
a Chancellor determined to equate income and spending but to cut welfare spending, whatever
the consequence for inequality and outright hardship.
Part 4: Retrospective Analysis of OBR’s Forecasts, 2010–2015
Since 2010, the Oice for Budget Responsibility has had the task of auditing HM Treasury’s
budget forecasts. It is interesting to see how a selection of those forecasts have turned out (Figure
10). The 2008 budget forecast in Figure 10 was one of the grossest economic mis-statements of
all time. In fairness, the Labour government of the time had been a deliverer of what seems, in
retrospect, to have been consistent economic performance, as indicated by Figures 1, 3 and 4.
The real interest in the data lies with various projections made from 2009 onwards. For clarity
only some of these can be shown. Perhaps most surprisingly, Labour forecasts in 2009 and 2010
were too pessimistic in their early expectations, but by the end of the projection periods were
acceptably close to outturns. In contrast the June 2010 forecast from the then new Coalition
government was substantially too optimistic as to outcome and even the limited part of the 2012
Pre-Budget Report forecast shown (chosen because it was, in efect, a mid-term report by the
Coalition government) contained major forecasting errors.
This paper does not seek to analyse in great detail why these diferences arose, but it is
important to note that the optimistic rhetoric of austerity delivered by governments since 2010
has not matched results whereas by the time it left oice the Labour government had adopted a
more realistic basis for economic forecasting.
One economic explanation for the divergence in forecasting success may have been provided
unwittingly by the OBR. The July 2015 Oice for Budget Responsibility report makes reference
to the multipliers used for the purposes of the projections that the Treasury have used and the
OBR have endorsed:
10http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/lawyers-strike-over-legal-aid-cuts-boosted-by-the-
backing-of-major-irms-10349009.html
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In June 2010, the interim OBR estimated the impact that the additional iscal tight-
ening announced in the Coalition’s irst Budget would have on growth through the
use of ‘iscal multipliers’. These implied that a discretionary tightening of 1 per cent
of GDP would, in the irst instance, reduce output by 1 per cent in the case of invest-
ment cuts; 0.6 per cent in the case of cuts to day to day public services and welfare
spending; 0.35 for VAT increases; and 0.3 per cent for income tax and NICs increases.
In this forecast, we have applied the same real multipliers that the interim OBR used
in the June 2010 forecast.
(Oice for Budget Responsibility, 2015, 39)
It is only fair to note that some taper efects of the application of these multipliers was changed
between 2010 and 2015 but, in the opinion of the authors of this paper, this is unlikely to have
had material impact on the forecasts made. The multipliers adopted by the OBR produced
forecasts where in most cases, excepting investment, the impact on growth of £1 of government
spending was somewhat less than the pound expended. The Oice for Budget Responsibility
does, of course, write this in the negative context of cuts, but this does not change the inference.
So, it was assumed that for every £1 of cuts the impact on GDP would be much less than the
value of the cut itself, excepting investment, where a cut would reduce GDP by £1 for every £1
of reduction.
This view, which has been consistently held throughout this period, contrast sharply with
two alternative opinions. The irst is from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook Report in 2012, which states that:
If the multipliers underlying the growth forecasts were about 0.5, as this informal
evidence suggests, our results indicate that multipliers have actually been in the 0.9
to 1.7 range since the Great Recession. This inding is consistent with research sug-
gesting that in today’s environment of substantial economic slack, monetary policy
constrained by the zero lower bound, and synchronized iscal adjustment across nu-
merous economies, multipliers may be well above 1.
(IMF, 2012, 43)
In other words, for every £1 of cuts the impact may well have been a loss to GDP of more
than £1, and could have been as high as £1.70. With average tax recovery of around 40% of
GDP in the UK this meant that for every £1 of cuts up to 68p of tax might have been lost in
revenue terms whilst overall people would feel worse of than the cuts themselves might imply:
in efect, the cuts were cutting capacity as Figure 5 implied with a real perceived cost resulting
as a consequence.
This opinion has been reinforced in 2015 by ratings agency Standards & Poor’s. In a report
published in January 2015, they argued with regard to the UK economy that11:
We estimate that an increase in public spending in one year of 1% of GDP (coordi-
nated across the EU) would result in a multiplier efect for the U.K. of 2.5 over three
years. This is a higher efect compared with the boost to spending in the U.K. alone,
which we estimated at 1.9. The main reason is the additional boost to U.K. GDP
due to increased demand from its European trade partners. We also project that
such investment would add more than 300,000 jobs in the same year as the increase
occurred.
(Standard and Poor, 2015)
11http://media.mhi.com/documents/20150211-sprs-infrastructure.pdf
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Figure 10. Source: HM Treasury Budgets and Pre-Budget Reports as noted
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It should be noted that this multiplier relates only to investment spending. The similarity
with the IMF estimate should be noted.
If the IMF or Standard & Poor’s multipliers were to be used, then the OBR would have
reached a far more pessimistic (but nonetheless, more accurate) estimate of the efects of austerity
on the UK economy. Labour assumed a much lower rate of cuts than the Coalition (even if, as is
likely, they used the same broad multiplier rates – budget reports for their period in oice do not
make this point clear) but as a result produced less distortive forecasts that, curiously, seemed
to predict the Coalition government’s actual achievements better than that government’s own
forecasts did.
The same error in estimating multipliers might also explain why David Blanchlower, who
served on the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee from 2006 to 2009, has suggested
that the UK recovery from the 2008 inancial crisis has been the worst of any recovery since the
1720 South Sea Bubble:
Figure 11. Source: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/britain-has-taken-longer-
to-recover-from-recession-than-at-any-time-since-the-south-sea-bubble-9645218.html
23
— CITYPERC WPS 2015/03 —
R MURPHY & R PALAN 2015
Part 5: The Feasibility of the Fiscal Charter
In light of the above we now turn to the question of whether ‘balancing the books’ by 2020 – the
self-imposed criterion for the success of George Osborne’s austerity programme as enshrined in
the UK Fiscal Charter adopted in October 2015,12 is possible or even desirable. This question
does demand consideration of whether the Oice for Budget Responsibility forecasts for the UK’s
sectoral balances until 2020 are plausible, or not.
The concept of sectoral balancing employs double entry accounting rationale.13 This approach
assumes that ‘sectoral accounts data constitute[s] a closed system in the sense that every asset
item in one sector’s balance sheet must have a counterparty liability item in another sector’s
balance sheet’ (Antoun de Almeida, 2015, 16). At core the idea is very simple: for every borrower
in a currency (in the UK’s case, sterling) there must be a lender. It follows that lending between
sectors must always balance. We stress that this is an accounting concept and not an economic
concept. And from an accounting perspective it is a simple matter of fact that must be true.
The sectors usually considered for this purpose are the government, private consumers, pri-
vate sector (usually considered to be business) investment, and the overseas sector. Figure 12
represents the OBR sectoral balances history and forecast in July 2015:
Figure 12. Source: Oice for Budget Responsibility, July 2015 Table 3.33
12http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2015/october/charter-for-budget-responsibility-autum-2015-
update/
13More formally, the two key accounting identities from which the concept of sectoral balancing is derived are:
GDP = C + S + T (uses)
GDP = C + I + G + (X – M) (sources)
Where C is total consumption, S is Savings, T is Taxation, I is Investment, G is Government Spending, X is
Exports and M is imports.
From which we can easily get:
(I – S) + (G – T) + (X – M) = 0
This identity makes clear that the transactions between the sectors must always balance. The issue is explained
in greater depth by, for example, Prof Malcolm Sawyer (http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/b836e12f-8e4d-4d22-
9310-a0a28a41860d/the-impossibility-of-balanced-structural-government-budgets.pdf)
24
— CITYPERC WPS 2015/03 —
WHY THE FISCAL CHARTER IS DOOMED TO FAIL
What this igure indicates is that the Oice for Budget Responsibility forecasts for balancing
the books is premised on very signiicant changes in patterns of behaviour within the UK economy
over the next few years. These are changes that we believe are unlikely to take place.
Anticipated changes in the sectoral balance are as follows: First, as Figure 12 shows, house-
holds are expected to abandon their cautious approach to saving that they have adopted since
2009. The OBR forecasts works on the assumption that from 2015 onward, the household sector
as a whole will neither save nor borrow for the foreseeable future.
Second, the OBR assumes that the business will abandon its policy of hoarding cash and
begin to invest heavily from 2015, using borrowed funds to do so.
Third, and most remarkably, it is assumed that the UK’s overall balance of trade and inancial
lows with overseas will change radically, requiring far fewer inlows into the UK economy which
are the current net consequence of the UK’s signiicant trade deicits.
Fourth, Figure 12 shows gradual decrease in state borrowing to the point, sometimes in 2019,
when the government will achieve its Fiscal Charter goal.
It is important to stress, however, that this fourth point is obtainable only if all three other
sectors perform as anticipated in the forecast. Unless they do so, as a matter of fact, George
Osborne will not clear the UK government’s deicit.
The challenges that these forecasts imply for the household, private and rest of the world
may appear innocuous, but they are not. Take, for example, the need for the household sector to
net stay in the position of being broadly neutral with regard to saving and dis-saving. Since the
sector as a whole is not, of course, homogenous, some will need to borrow for others to save, as
has been the marked tendency over the past few years. As a result the OBR themselves forecast
that for the net trend to be neutral the borrowing of those who do take credit will have to grow
substantially:
Figure 13. Source: Oice for Budget Responsibility, July 2015 Table 3.25
Borrowing will have to reach and then exceed 2008 levels. This may be possible, according
to the OBR’s own forecast, if there is steady house price inlation over the coming ive years,
25
— CITYPERC WPS 2015/03 —
R MURPHY & R PALAN 2015
increasing to a rate of almost six per cent per annum. Without that increase in prices there will
be insuicient increase in mortgage lending to achieve this growth in borrowing However, not
only is this a rather optimistic forecast, it also runs counter to another one of the government’s
cherished claims: making housing afordable. In efect, the Fiscal Charter is predicated on an
ongoing housing bubble. It is not obvious to the authors of this paper why such a policy of
encouraging a housing bubble is considered to be good economic policy. Indeed, a recent IMF
report emphasises the unique position of the housing market in the UK, and the great volatility
it imparts to the economy. The report notes:
Although mortgage credit as a share of GDP has been declining in the current housing
recovery, there are signs that there is a buildup of inancial risks: loan-to-income ratios
are increasing in London and among irst time buyers […]
Given the uncertainty of the transmission of mechanism of macroprudential policies,
there are merits in adopting macroprudential policy measures early and gradually.
(IMF, 2015, 17)
In other words, the IMF strongly advises the UK against house prices inlation. In any event,
we doubt that the OBR forecast is credible. In October 2015 a national estate agent forecast
average house price inlation for the period of less than 3 per cent,14 whilst the Bank of England
has also made it clear that it will heavily monitor mortgage lending and even lending in general15
– a move intended to restrict growth in borrowing. Neither suggestion supports the OBR view
that personal or mortgage borrowing can increase as they forecast.
With regard to business, the condition for the forecast borrowing being met is that investment
reaches levels not seen since before 1980. A recent IMF report believes that the current pick-up
in business investment in the UK is likely to be sustained (IMF, 2015, 28) but warns:
A challenge is to formulate appropriate policy prescription […] First, eforts should
continue to improve inancial intermediation, especially aimed at ensuring adequate
access to inance for business innovation and restructuring. Second, infrastructure
should continue to be improved, especially in the areas of transport, energy, and
housing. Third, as recommended by LSE Growth Commission (2013), corporate
governance structure could be reviewed to address “short-termism” and encourage
irms to invest more. Finally, policies should continue to support human capital
development, including through enhancing vocational training and apprenticeship
programs to help bolster productivity. In this regard, the UK should not halt eforts
to attract foreign talents.
(IMF, 2015, 28)
Needless to say, these policy eforts would require considerable additional investment and
borroowing by the UK government, all of which appear to be a pre-condition of business sus-
taining its contribution to investment. The problem is that the Fiscal Charter policy is likely to
prevent that necessary government investment. What is more, we believe that the IMF report is
couched in polite political language: it presents a description of where the UK could be if, and
only if, the UK would abandon its commitments to the Fiscal Charter. Like most commentators
we believe the Fiscal Charter is no more than a political ‘stunt’, but there is enough political
capital invested in the idea of austerity to ensure that none of the above wish-list will be pursued
with any vigour. As such, the hoped-for levels of business investment forecast by the OBR, and
shown in Figure 14, are very unlikely to happen.
14http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/nov/05/uk-house-prices-forecast-savills
15https://next.ft.com/content/3ce277ac-83d9-11e5-8e80-1574112844fd?ftcamp=crm/email/2015115/nbe/InTodaysFT/product
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Figure 14. Source: Oice for Budget Responsibility, July 2015 Table 3.26
The overseas sector forecast is, according to the Oice for Budget Responsibility subject to
‘signiicant uncertainty’ (page 70). The chance that the UK will see a signiicant improvement in
its balance of trade or see net inancial outlows when it is currently a safe haven for investment
on two counts (UK gilts and London property) seems very unlikely.
Given these observations the chance that the government will clear its deicit, which can only
happen if it net saves, which by implication requires that households, business or the overseas
sector must borrow more, appears to be remote.
What is more, we note that if the rate of inaccuracy from 2011–12 to 2015–16 was replicated
in the years 2015–16 to 2019–20 then, based on the July 2015 OBR forecast an additional £162
billion would be borrowed over this period, and at the end of the 2015-2020 parliament the
budget would not be running a surplus of £10.2 billion but would instead be showing a deicit
of £39.3 billion. The scale of the potential inaccuracy in forecasts is, in that case, signiicant
and the possibility that this could result in a signiicant mismatch between the political rhetoric
of austerity and the apparent costs and beneits arising from the policy is high. The political
ramiications of that mismatch are not for this paper to consider.
Part 6: Conclusions
As is now apparent, in our opinion the probability that the currently proposed programme of
austerity will achieve its stated goal of a balanced budget in 2019–20 is low. The government
appears, however, politically committed to achieve such a goal. This then presents a three-
fold prospect for potential consequences, presuming that this mismatch between outcomes and
expectations arises.
The irst is that many people in the UK will pay increased income taxes and national insurance
over the next few years while sufering signiicantly reduced services from the government. This
will create an increased expectation gap between many on middle-income in the UK and the
government, where payment made and perceived value received will increasingly difer.
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Second, this is likely to be happening at a time when the political narrative of austerity may
appear to be failing. The possibility of signiicant political stress as a consequence cannot be
ignored. The likelihood that increased questioning of the motives of the government in imposing
the stress required to achieve the goal of austerity is likely.
Third, if a balanced budget is not delivered, the risk is that the UK economy will appear
to be out of economic control (even though that may not be true). If this resulted in pressure
being brought to bear on the government via inancial markets then risks to the UK’s interest
and exchange rate policies might arise, making achievement of balanced economy recovery (with
or without a balanced state budget) signiicantly more diicult.
What is clear in all these scenarios is that the risk is one of perception. The 2010 – 2015
government failed to deliver on its promise of a balanced budget but the core philosophy of
austerity survived possibly because no alternative narrative emerged and, for many, the impact
of the policy was relatively limited during this period. The current forecasts suggest that during
the life of the 2015–2020 government there will be an increased impact on the lives of many
people in the UK as a result of the pursuit of austerity whilst the policy may still not succeed.
This creates an entirely diferent political environment to that faced by the last government that
may result in creating previously unknown stresses for a government seeking to shrink the size
of the UK state. The consequences are not clear at present.
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